This somewhat peculiar name is ancient and general, but our statutes of registration substitute for it the phrase "managing owner." l A ship's husband is usually, indeed almost always, a part-owner; but we are aware of no rule of law requiring this; although it is implied in the phrase which we have just stated to be employed in our statutes, of "managing owner." He is the general agent of all the owners in respect to the ship. It is not customary to define his powers or his duties by a written instrument of agency or authority, or even by an oral bargain. And the reason is, that these duties are sufficiently determined by usage. They are such as may be included in taking care of her and of her earnings. Thus, he must keep her in complete seaworthiness, as to her own condition, her furniture and all appurtenances, and her papers. He makes contracts for her freight and all her earnings, and receives the same; (h) but he cannot borrow money and bind the owners for it;(i) nor can he give up the lien for freight earned; (j) nor can he insure the ship for the owners;2 nor can he purchase a cargo for them (k) without their special authority. (l) But the universal rule of agency applies here, and any of these acts * done in their name may be ratified by them so as to bind them, equally as if an authority to do these things had been originally conferred. (m) He cannot dele(g) See Brodie v. Howard, 17 C. B. 109, 33 Eng. L. & Eq. 146; Revens v. Lewis, 2 Paine, C. C. 202; King v. Lowry, 20 Barb. 532.

(h) 1 Bell, Comm. 410, § 428, 4th ed.; id. p. 504,5th ed.; Sims v. Brittain, 4B.& Ad. 375; Owston v. Ogle, 13 East, 538; Benson v. Heathorn, 1 Younge & C. Ch. 326; Turner v. Borrows, 8 Wend. 144; Gould v. Stanton, 16 Conn. 12, 28; Smith v. Lay, 3 Kay & J. 105; Darby v. Baines, 9 Hare, 369,12 Eng. L. & Eq. 238.

(i) 1 Bell, Comm. 4th ed. 411.

(j) 1 Bell, Comm. 4th ed. 411.

(k) Hewett v. Buck, 17 Maine, 147.

(l) Ogle v. Wrangham, coram Kenyan, C. J., Guildhall Sitting, H. T. 1790, Abbott on Shipping, 107; French v. Backhouse, 5 Burr. 2727 ; Turner v. Burrows, 5 Wend. 541, 8 Wend. 144; Foster v. U. S. Ins. Co. 11 Pick. 85.

(m) Hagedorn v. Oliverson, 2M.&S. 485; Routh v. Thompson, 13 East, 274.

1 As to the powers of a ship's husband, or managing owner, see Mitchell v. Chambers, 43 Mich. 150.

2 Nor can he cancel a charter-party. Thomas v. Lewis, 4 Ex. D. 18. See McCready v. Thorn, 51 N. Y. 454; Hamilton v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 106 Mass. 395; Knight v. Eureka, 4c Ins. Co. 26 Ohio St 664; Woods v. Pickett, 30 La. An. 1095.

gate his authority; especially not where any exercise of discretion is required on his part; but like any other agent he may employ suitable persons to assist him or act under him in a ministerial capacity.

In transactions in which the ship's husband may bind the owners, a party may deal with him alone and on his personal credit only, and in such a way that he justifies the owners in believing that he deals with their agent only on his own credit. But he would not be thereby estopped from resorting to the owners, unless he had permitted them, in that belief, so to settle their accounts with their agent, that they would be injured if made responsible to the party dealing with him. (n)

By usage in this country he is entitled to a commission of two and one-half per cent for purchasing the outfits and paying the bills of a vessel; and he may charge interest on the excess of his disbursements over the amounts received by him, from the time of the occurrence of such excess. (o)

An agent of a whaling ship who is authorized to fit the vessel for sea and purchase supplies, cannot, it would seem, bind the owners by accepting a bill of exchange in their names, for such supplies. (p) But if he has general authority to act for the vessel and to settle with the seamen, he may bind the other owners by a promise to pay the amount of a seaman's wages, with his consent, to one of the creditors, who has attached the same on trustee process, and special authority need not be shown. (q)

A general agent of all the owners would hold all the owners responsible in solido (or each for the whole) for his proper charges. But if he be part-owner and ship's husband, each of the partowners is responsible to him only for his own share. (r) But if one or more part-owners became insolvent, a court of equity or of admiralty would require each of the solvent owners * to pay his share of the deficit, so that the ship's husband might sustain only his own share of the loss. And if he himself advances the share or contribution of any part-owner he may sue him for it. But a ship's husband has no lien for his advances on the vessel or the proceeds of it. (s)

(n) Thompson v. Finden, 4 Car. & P. 158; Muldon v. Whitlock, 1 Cow. 290; Reed v. White, 5 Esp. 122.

(o) Rennell v. Kimball, 5 Allen, 356.

(p) Tatar v. Cannon, 8 Met. 456.

(q) Monroe v. Holmes, 5 Allen, 201.

(r) Helme v. Smith, 7 Bing. 709; Brown v. Tapscott, 6M. & W. 119.

(s) The Larch, 2 Curtis, C. C. 427; Ex parte Young, 2 Ves. & B. 242; Smith v. De Silva, Cowp. 469.