In Meguire v. Corwine, 101 U. S. 111, Trist v. Child was reaffirmed. See to same general effect, Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274; Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543; Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200; Gil v. Williams, 12 La. An. 219. In Marshall v. R. R., 16 How. 336, "log rolling" was held indictable. See, also, as to corrupt legislative combinations, opinion of Judge Curtis, Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. sec 1375.

It must be remembered, however, that compromise is the basis of all legislation in parliamentary government, and that to declare that all combinations in which there are mutual concessions are illegal is to affix the stamp of illegality on many beneficent legislative acts. This was strikingly illustrated in the proceedings which gave the English crown to William of is to affect legislation by any other means than open argument, then a contract to promote such object will not be sustained. Even an agreement by which signatures to a petition are obtained by promise of money has been held invalid;1 and so of an agreement to grant to individuals the right of passing a gate free from toll on condition of their withdrawing their opposition to a bill before the legislature.2 sec 403. An agreement by which a party, for a contingent fee, agrees to influence government to grant a contract for purchase of supplies, will not be enforced by the courts.3 " Considerations," it was said, "as to the most efficient and economical mode of meeting the public wants should alone control in this respect the action of every department of government. No other consideration can lawfully enter into the transaction, so far as the government is concerned. Such is the rule of public policy, and whatever tends to introduce any other element into the transaction is against public policy. That agreements like the one under consideration have this tendency is manifest. They tend to introduce personal solicitation and personal influence as elements in the procurement of contracts, and thus directly lead to inefficiency in the public service and to unnecessary expenditures of the public funds. . . . All agreements for pecuniary considerations to control the business operations of the government, or the regular administration of justice, or the appointment to public offices, or the ordinary course of legislation, are void as against public policy, without reference to the question whether improper means are contemplated or used in their execution. The law looks to the general tendency of such agreements, and it closes the door to temptation by refusing them recognition in any of the courts of the country."1 And this rule applies to contracts to corruptly influence officers of foreign governments.2 A contract, also, to procure an appointment to a public office by private influence is invalid;3 and so of a contract to obtain, for a contingent fee, the discharge of a drafted soldier;4 and of a contract to obtain from the executive the appointment of C, the promisor, as special counsel, in consideration of the promisor dividing his fee with the promisee.5 But it is otherwise as to professional services in procuring a pension or similar executive action.6 The distinction in these cases is the same as that already taken in reference to applications to the legislature. If the object of a contract is to lay a matter properly before an executive, there is not only no reason why it should be invalidated, but many reasons why it should be sustained. So far from corruption being stimulated by agents of eminence appearing to represent private interests before the executive, such agencies, publicly acknowledged, and acting openly, are important instruments in preventing corruption. Hence contracts for services in applications for contracts, when honest and fair, will be sustained.1 - Under this head may be noticed a celebrated English ruling to the effect that a limitation in the will of the seventh Earl of Bridgewater that if his devisee should not acquire the title of Marquis or Duke of Bridge-water, or should accept any inferior title, the estates should go over. The judges, eight against two, sustained the limitation, but this was reversed in the house of lords by four to one, Lords Lyndhurst, Brougham, Truro, and St. Leonards holding that such a limitation was against the policy of the law as putting an undue pressure on government, from which the appointments to peerages proceed. Lord Cranworth dissented, holding the limitation good.2

And so of agreement to corruptly influence executive.

Orange, and which, as Macaulay vividly shows, were a compromise between two parties, disagreeing in their general conceptions of government, and agreeing only in the conclusion that James II. had abdicated the throne. - In our early congressional history we have an analogous compromise recorded. In Jefferson's Ana (Jeff. Works, ix. 93, see Irving's Life of Washington, v. 70), we have detailed the compromise by which, after the funding bill was defeated by southern votes, its reconsideration was carried and its passage insured by a bargain by which the northern members agreed to place the seat of government on the Potomac in consideration of enough votes to carry the funding bill. Mr. Clay's compromise and "omnibus" bills were made up in the same way. Members from one section agreed to vote for what was distasteful to them in consideration of aid from another section in carrying a measure in which they were particularly interested. See as to barter of offices, infra, sec 407.

1 Maguire v. Smock, 42 Ind. 1.

2 Pingry v. Washburn, 1 Aik. 264. That a contract fraudulently concocted between an engineer employed by a local board and a contractor is void, see Wakefield Banking Co. v. Norman-ton Local Board, 44 L. T. N. S. 697, cited supra, sec 279.

3 Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45.

1 See Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152; Ashburner v. Parrish, 81 Penn. St. 52; O'Hara v. Carpenter, 23 Mich. 410; Pickett v. School Dist., 25 Wis. 551; Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543; Kelly v. Devlin, 58 How. N.Y. Pr. 487; Hutchen v. Gibson, 1 Bush, 270.

2 Hope v. Hope. 8 D. G. M. & G. 731; Watson p. Murray, 8 C. E. Green, 257. In Oscanyanr. Arms Co., 15 Blatch". C. C. 79, aff. S. C. U. S. 1881, 103 U. S. 261, an agreement was made by a manufacturer of rifles with the Turkish Consul General at New York that in case such consul should influence an agent of the Turkish government employed to purchase arms to purchase rifles of such manufacturer, the consul would receive a commission upon the purchase. It was held that the contract was illegal and would not be enforced in the United States, even though it would have been legal in Turkey. See opinion, supra, sec 402, and see Cook v. Shipman, 51 111. 316.

3 Davison v. Seymour, 1 Bosw. 88; Hager v. Catlin, 18 Hun, 448; Filson v. Himes, 5 Barr, 452; infra, sec 407. See Weld v. Lancaster, 56 Me. 453, where a sale of a government contract was held invalid.

4 Bowman v. Coffroth, 59 Penn. St. 19.

5 Maguire v. Corwine, 101 U. S. 101.

6 Painter v. Drum, 40 Penn. St. 467; Formby v. Pryor, 15 Ga. 258.