This section is from the book "A Commentary On The Law Of Contracts", by Francis Wharton. Also available from Amazon: A Commentary On The Law Of Contracts.
A contract is to be interpreted as a whole, and a meaning involving the consideration of all its stipulations is to be ascertained.1 "It is a true rule of construction that the sense and meaning of the parties in any particular part of an instrument may be collected ex antecedentis et consequentibus. Every part of it may be brought into action in order to collect from the whole one uniform and consistent sense, if that may be done."2 Even an isolated clause must be judged by the context, since it is only by the context that the full sense of the clause can be known.3 Hence a memorandum endorsed on the margin of a policy is to be taken into consideration in construing the policy.4 - It is not essential, in order to take into consideration the whole document, that it should be construed grammatically. The old system of conveyancing was so cumbrous and complex as to make accurate grammatical arrangement almost impossible; and it would destroy the efficacy of many informal memoranda involving large business interests if ungramrnati-cal clauses were to be rejected. Hence, in order to carry out the intent, the meaning will be collected from the whole document without regard to its grammatical construction.1 "We regard the rule as well settled, that when the contract or promise is unilateral, and the body of the contract fails, for any reason, to express the agreement between the parties, and a memorandum is made upon the same paper, either upon the margin or at the foot, above or below the signature of the promisor, or endorsed upon the back, and delivered with and as part of the contract, the whole instrument constitutes but one contract, and the memorandum is as much part of it as if written in the body of it."2 And when one part of a contract, by a literal construction, would abrogate other parts, such a liberal construction should be adopted as would give effect to the entire document.3
Whole context is to be taken into consideration.
1 Parkhnrst V. Smith, Willes, 332; Browning V. Wright, 2 Bos. & Pul. 13; Barton V. Fitzgerald, 15 East, 541; Nind V. Marshall, 1 Br. & B. 319; Sicklemore V. Thistleton, 6 M. & S. 12; Miller V. Travers, 8 Bing. 244; Richards V. Bluck, 6 C. B. 437; Washburn V. Gould, 3 Story, 162; Patrick V. Grant, 14 Me. 233; Chase V. Bradley, 26 Me. 531; Nettleton V. Billings, 13 N. H. 446; Wheelock V. Freeman, 13 Pick. 167; Field V. Woodmansey, 10 Cush. 431; Pembroke Iron Co. V. Parsons, 5 Gray, 589; Talbot V. Heath, 126 Mass. 139; Smith V. Emerson, 126 Mass. 169; Rolker V. Ins. Co., 3 Keyes, 17; Butterfield V. Cooper, 6 Cow. 48; Edelman V. Yeakel, 27 Penn. St. 26; Allison's App., 77 Penn. St. 221; Hopkins V. Sanford, 38 Mich. 611; Drake V. Vorse, 52 Iowa, 417; Sanger V. Dun, 47 Wis. 615; Wheeler, etc., V. Gallivan, 10 Neb. 313; see Wharton V. Fisher, 2 S. & R. 178; Lndwig V. Leonard, 9 W. & S. 144; Tate V. Tate, 75 Va. 522; and see Moneypenny V. Moneypenny, 3 De G. & J. 572, for a full consideration of the rule by Lord Chelmsford. That this is the case in construing conditions, see supra, sec 555. In Dodd V. Mitchell,.
77 Ind. 388, it was held that a word plainly omitted from a written contract by inadvertence will always be supplied to accomplish justice by enforcing the intention of the parties. See supra, sec 210.
2 Lord Ellenborough, Barton V. Fitzgerald, 15 East, 54.
3 Stavers V. Curling, 3 Scott, 740.
4 Bell V. Ins. Co., 8 S. & R. 98. In Hutley V. Marshall, 46 L. T. N. S. 186, the suit was on the following engagement: "Witness, John Hutley, Rivenhall, Oct. 2, 1860. Three months' notice I promise to pay Mr. Jonathan Hutley interest 5l. per cent. per annum for 500l. value received. Dan Marshall, Charles Marshall. [5s. stamp.] 500/." It was admitted that, upon the 2d Oct., 500/. was advanced by Jonathan Hutley to Dan Marshall, and that Charles Marshall, the defendant, signed as surety for his brother. It was held that this was a good promissory note for 500/.; and it was ruled that, where the words in the body of a note are ambiguous, the figures at the bottom of the note and the stamp may be looked at in construing them.
 
Continue to: