Sec 674

When there is a general conveyance of a right, this implies a conveyance of all the powers incidental to the exercise of such right.3 It is otherwise when after general terms of conveyance specifications are made indicating that the right is to be exercised in a particular way by the promisee or grantee. In such case the exercise of the right is to be ordinarily confined to the modes specified.4 The question in the text is one as to which there will be necessarily great conflict of opinion, since, in its bearing on political issues in this country it is a question as to which men will divide according as their tendencies are imperialistic or particularistic - as they are disposed to see great powers centralized in the national government, or are convinced that it is safer and wiser that the reserved powers should be deposited in the states - as they are, in other words, broad constructionists or strict constructionists. - It should be remembered, however, that though logically the application of the maxim to political documents should be the same as its application to business documents, there are considerations applicable in the political field which are not applicable in the business field. - So far as concerns statutory powers, it may be generally held that where there is a statute "creating a corporation for a particular purpose, and giving it powers for that particular purpose, what it does not expressly or impliedly authorize may be taken as prohibited."5 In respect to business contracts, the rule is that "where parties have entered into written engagements with express stipulations, it is manifestly not desirable to extend them by implication; the presumption is that, having expressed some, they have expressed all the conditions by which they intend to be bound under that instrument."1 This, however, is to be subject to the general principle that the whole intention of the instrument is to be taken into consideration; and if the specification is introduced by way of illustration, and not of limitation, it is not to restrict the prior general terms.2

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

1 Chase V. Bradley, 26 Me. 538; Jackson V. Ireland, 3 Wend. 99; But-terfield V. Cooper, 6 Cow. 481.

2 Loper V. U. S., 13 Ct. of Cl. 269. 3 See 1 Kent, Com. Part ii. Lect. xii.;.

2 Story Const. 429-440, 519-538; Pollock, 3d ed. 132.

4 Ibid.

5 Lord Blackburn in At. Gen. V. R. R., L. R. 5 Ap. Ca. 481; R. V. Read, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 488.

1 Aspdin V. Austen, 5 Q. B. 683; Emmens V. Elderton, 4 H. L. Cas. 624.

2 See Price V. R. R., 16 M. & W. 244: Attwood V. Small, 6 Cl. & F. 232;.

Saunders V. Erans, 8 H. L. Ca. 729, and cases cited Brown's Leg. Max. 654 et seq.