1 Beeson V. Patterson, 36 Penn. St. 24.

"Where a stipulation is capable of two meanings equally consistent with the language employed, that shall be taken which is most against the stipulator, and in favor of the other party." Per cur. in McConnel V. Murphy, L. R. 5 P. C. 219; see Lincoln V. Wilder, 29 Me. 169; Cocheco Co. V. Whittier, 10 N. H. 305; Jackson V. Blodget, 16 Johns. 172.

"Where there are several ways in which the contract might be performed, that mode is adopted which is the least profitable to the plaintiff, and the least burthensome to the defendant." Maule, J., Cockburn V. Alexander, 6 C. B. 814, quoted Leake, 2d ed. 232; S. P. Garrison V. U. S., 7 Wall. 688; see Melvin V. Proprietors, 5 Met. (Mass.) 15.

"It is a well-known rule in the construction of private grants, if the meaning of the words be doubtful, to construe them most strongly against the grantor." Story, J., Charles River Bridge V. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters, 589; S. P. Winslow V. Patten, 36 Me. 369; Thrall V. Newell, 19 Vt. 202; Mills V. Catlin, 22 Vt. 98; Melvin V. Proprietors, 5 Met. (Mass.) 27; and see Mayer V. Isaac, 6 M. & W. 612; Pike V. Munroe, 36 Me. 309; supra, sec 654. A guaranty, for instance, is to be construed most strongly against the guarantor, supra, sec 656; Stephens V. Pell, 2 C. & M. 710; Hargrave V. Smee, 6 Bing. 244.

2 Barney V. Newcomb, 9 Cush. 46. In the Roman law the same position is repeatedly affirmed. L. 38, sec 18, I. 99 pr. I. sec 106 - D. de V. O. 45, I.; L. 26, D. de reb. dub. 34.5 - Seuff. Arch. III. 301.

3 Supra, sec 641 et seq.; Cardigan V. Armitage, 2 B. & C. 197; Brown V. McGrau, 14 Pet. 480; Beckwith V. Howard, 6 R. I. 1.

4 Ibid.; Browning V. Wright, 2 B. & P. 22; Donnell V. Ins. Co., 2 Sumn. 366; Jackson V. Hudson, 3 John. 387. This is virtually the distinction of Dr. Paley, supra, sec 657.

1 Lindus V. Melrose, 3 H. & N. 177; Borradaile V. Hunter, 5 M. & G. 639; Barton V. Fitzgerald, 15 East, 546; Adams V. Warner, 23 Vt. 411.

2 1 Ch. on Cont. 11th Am. ed. 138.

3 Ibid., citing 1 Kent Com. 557.

4 Supra, sec 666; Buller V. Denning, 5 B. & C. 842; Jackson V. Laurence, 11 Johns. 191; Cochecho Co. V. Whit-tier, 10 N. H. 305. See Munn V. Baker, 2 Stark. 226; Ford V. Beach, 11 Q. B. 852, where it was held that ambiguities were to be construed so as best to bring out the general sense.

The following distinctions from Mr. Powell are well worthy of consideration:5 " If there be in the terms of a contract any obscurity or dubiousness, which cannot be cleared up by the intention of the contracting parties, or any other circumstance, and all other rules of exposition of words fail, then the construction ought to be against him who ought to have explained himself or made the other have delivered himself fully. And, therefore, he who is obliged ought to speak clearly, or otherwise, in general, the other party has a right to explain the clause for his own advantage..In this rule of construction the law of England agrees with the Roman law, wherein it was a maxim that all obscurities and ambiguities in a bargain of sale, or letting, must be interpreted against the seller or landlord." "But," Mr. Powell adds, "in this respect the determination of the common law of England and the Roman law, are, in some instances, in opposition to the nature of things; for if the thing contracted about be burdensome to the party whose words are to be expounded, the interpretation to be agreeable to the intent, as the latter must be presumed from the nature of things, ought to be favorable to him; for every one seeks his own advantage, and consequently engages himself to as little inconvenience as possible; whereas, according to the construction alluded to, he is presumed to have bound himself as strictly as the words in their largest sense will effect. Therefore, perhaps, we should come nearer the truth, if we were to hold that the contracting party for whose benefit the agreement is burdensome to the other, is he who should either explain himself, or make the other explain himself, with all the clearness necessary to prevent ambiguity or obscurity." Hence, "words or sentences used in the condition of a bond, which, considered simply in their own nature, are equivocal or ambiguous, shall, generally, in respect of the object of the condition, be taken in ease and favor of the obligor; the reason of which seems to be, that they are inserted for his advantage, and to discharge him from a penalty."1 "Another exception to the rule of accepting ambiguous words most strongly against the speaker, is where such construction will work a wrong to others..Subject to the above observation, words are to be understood in the most comprehensive sense in which they are generally accepted."2 The Roman rule, to the above effect, is based on the assumption that the party against whom, in case of ambiguity, the ambiguity is to be construed, could, if he had desired, have expressed himself more clearly;3 "quia potuit - apertius dicere." To the same effect is Boehmer's conclusion: " in-terpretatio facienda est contra eum qui clarius loqui debuisset."4 The question upon this arises, who is the party whose duty it was to have introduced greater definiteness into the contract ? Now it may happen that the party from whom certain expressions nominally emanate may not be the party from whom they actually emanate; as when certain clauses are taken from a draft by the other party, or where a scrivener is employed who is the agent of the other party, or who is the common agent of both parties. It may also happen that the party from whom the paper emanates may be a mere stake-holder standing impartially between the real litigants; or that by the misconduct of the other side the blame of his failure to express himself accurately should fall on such other side and not on himself.5 Should any one of these exceptions exist, the duty being shifted, the inference from it falls.

5 Powell Cont. (N. Y. 1825) 237 et seq.