This section is from the book "Business Law - Case Method", by William Kixmiller, William H. Spencer. See also: Business Law: Text and Cases.
Furniture, belonging to Fenner, was delivered to the railroad company, directed to Fenner, at Dunkirk, New York. The furniture arrived at Dunkirk during the afternoon of May 24, and was unloaded and placed in a suitable freight house of the company. During the latter part of the same afternoon, Austin, a teamster, who was authorized by Fenner to obtain the furniture, applied for it. The agent was busy, and it was becoming late, so it was agreed that Austin should return for the furniture upon the following day. During that night, without negligence on the part of the company, a fire occurred, destroying the goods. This was an action by Fenner for the loss.
The railroad contended that its liability as common carrier had ceased when the goods were stored; that it was then liable only as warehouseman, and under an obligation to exercise due care only, and since it was not shown that it failed to exercise due care, it should not be held for the loss.
Justice Earle gave the decision and said: "From the drift of decisions in this state, I think we may fairly infer the following rules as to the delivery of goods at their place of destination by a railroad carrier: If the consignee is present upon the arrival of the goods, he must take them without unreasonable delay. If he be not present, but lives at or in the immediate vicinity of the place of delivery, the carrier must notify him of the arrival of the goods, and then he has a reasonable time to take and remove them. If he is absent, unknown, or cannot be found, then the carrier can place the goods in the freight house, and, after keeping them a reasonable time, if the consignee does not call for them, its liability as a carrier ceases. If, after the arrival of the goods, the consignee has a reasonable opportunity to remove them, and does not, he cannot hold the carrier as an insurer."
Under the circumstances of this case, the court was of the opinion that the transit was at an end. Consequently, judgment was given for the company, since no negligence on the part of the company was shown.
The plaintiff in this case held three bills of lading, each for 500 bales of hemp, shipped from Manila to New York upon the Titania. Upon the arrival of the ship in New York, 1,144 bales were safely delivered to the plaintiff, but the remaining 56 were lost. There was no satisfactory evidence as to what became of them. This was an action by the plaintiff to recover the value thereof. The owner of the boat, the defendant in this case, contends that he made a constructive delivery of the hemp. He contends that it was unloaded on the wharf in New York, and more than that he was not required to do.
Mr. Coxe, Circuit Judge, said: "In order to make a valid delivery, which relieves the carrier from liability, it is necessary to show that the goods in question were landed on the wharf, segregated from the general cargo, so as to be conveniently accessible to the consignee ; that notice was given of their arrival and location, and a reasonable time allowed for their removal. Manifestly, it is not a good delivery to deposit the entire cargo of the ship on the wharf, and inform inquiring owners that, if their goods arrived, they will be found somewhere in the general mass of merchandise."
"There was no actual delivery; this proposition must be conceded. To establish a constructive delivery, it was necessary for the defendant to show, first, that he separated the plaintiff's goods from the general cargo; second, that he properly designated the goods; third, that he gave due notice to the plaintiff of the time and place of delivery. There is no proof sufficient to establish any of these essential conditions to relief from liability." Judgment was given for the plaintiff.
The question as to when the carrier's responsibility, as a public servant, ceases, is of importance, because of the difference in its liability as a common carrier, and an ordinary bailee. We have already learned that a carrier is liable as an insurer. An ordinary bailee who has possession of the property of another, is responsible for its loss, only when he has been negligent. The question is of importance, therefore, in all those cases where the loss occurs, other than by the act of God, public enemy, or the owner's negligence. There are three distinct rules in the different jurisdictions of the United States as to the termination of the common carriage. These are known as (1) the Massachusetts Rule; (2) the New Hampshire Rule; (3) the Michigan Rule.
The Massachusetts Rule provides that the carrier's liability as a common carrier ceases when it has deposited the goods at the station, ready for the consignee to receive them, and that, thereafter, the carrier's responsibility is that of a mere bailee, responsible only for its own negligence.
The New Hampshire Rule is that the liability of the carrier, as common carrier, continues until the consignee has had a reasonable time after their arrival in which to remove the goods, in the common course of business, but it does not require the carrier to give notice to the consignee.
The Michigan Rule requires the carrier to give the consignee notice of the arrival of the shipment, and continues its liability as common carrier until the consignee has had a reasonable time after notice to take the property away.
Under the Massachusetts Rule, the talking machine company, in the Story Case, could not hold the railroad company for the loss. Under the other two rules, it could obtain judgment, since the consignee had not had a reasonable time, after the arrival of the goods, to haul them from the station. The question of reasonable time is always one of fact for the jury to determine.
 
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