It is not enough that the defendants should have known that the representations were false; it is also necessary that the plaintiff should have been ignorant of such falsity, and should have believed the statements to be true. The purpose of an action for deceit is not to punish the defendant, but to recompense the plaintiff for the injury he has received. If he had knowledge of the falsity of the statements made by the defendant, he cannot have been injured thereby. If, in spite of his knowledge of such falsity, he still enters into the contract with the defendant he must be deemed to have done so on account of some other motive than that furnished by the statements known to be false.28 And it has been held that the plaintiff cannot maintain an action of deceit merely for the loss of a good bargain, as where a vendor misrepresents the boundaries of the land and the purchaser on discovering that the vendor has no title to a part of the land within the boundaries as represented, refuses to accept the deed; the remedy being an action to recover back the purchase money.29

The question, whether in each particular case, the plaintiff was justified in relying upon the representations of the defendant, or should have investigated the truth of the matter for himself, is a question of fact for the jury. The defendant can never set up the manifest absurdity of his false representations as a defense to an action of deceit against him. In Barnett vs. Ferderick,30 the Court said: "It is difficult to draw a line beyond which human credulity cannot go, especially in speculations in mining stocks. If the representations were so extravagant that sensible, cautious people would not have believed them, that is a proper consideration for the jury in determining whether plaintiff believed and relied upon them; but it does not preclude a finding that plaintiff did so, nor relieve defendant from his liability for his fraud if he committed fraud. It is as much an actionable fraud wilfully to deceive a credulous person with an improbable falsehood as it is to deceive a cautious, sagacious person with a plausible one. The law draws no line between the two falsehoods. It only asks, in either case, was the he spoken with intent to deceive and defraud, and was the false statement believed and money paid on the faith that it was true? These questions are for the jury."

27 14 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 2nd Ed., p. 153.

28 Clantman vs. Bailey, 62 N. H., 44; Stafford vs. Newson, 31 N. C, 509; Spencer vs. King, 5 Ohio S. and C. Pl. Dec, 113; Loper vs. Robinson, 54 Tex 510. 29 20 Cy.' 32; Fogan vs. Newson, 12 N. C, 20.